It serves the interest of the peoples of Central Europe to overcome historical traumas, but this has preconditions. The Hungarian-Serbian reconciliation process can serve as an example for the wider region and gives hope that, with fairness, a more stable, resilient region, more resistant to external interference from major powers, can be built.
On 26 June 2013, János Áder and Tomislav Nikolić, the then Hungarian and Serbian heads of state, paid a joint tribute to the memory of the executed innocents in Čurug, Vojvodina. The reconciliation efforts of Hungary and Serbia are not only unique in the region but also in Europe. The best-known reconciliation processes are the Franco-German and German-Polish ones, but the Hungarian-Serbian one deserves attention.
The peoples of Europe, and the wider context, of the world, fought many wars against each other, the chronology of which made up the history that is an important component of each people’s identity. Reconciliation processes are therefore extremely difficult; it is not easy for either the winner or the loser to overcome their own national narratives, but reconciliation does require it to some degree. It is no coincidence that there are enormous difficulties in developing common history books or even a common interpretation of a historical event.
In the case of reconciliation processes, we always see that the importance of individuals is not negligible: the Franco-German reconciliation required the good interpersonal relationship between De Gaulle and Adenauer, and the German-Polish reconciliation required the personal example of Willy Brandt, who was committed to Ostpolitik . Even so, reconciliation processes will hardly be more than a signed agreement unless they are backed by the societies of the countries concerned. The French-German and German-Polish reconciliation processes now look back over several decades, but the latter in particular is still very fragile today, due to a lack of trust: For example, Poland is still unwilling to base its army on German military technology and looks to the United States as its main security guarantor.
The close and trusting relationship between the leaders of the two countries was also necessary for Hungarian-Serbian reconciliation, and without a good relationship between Viktor Orbán and Aleksandr Vučić there would have been no chance of progress. However, there are other factors that contributed to reconciliation: after the failures of the 1990s, Serbia chose a new foreign policy course, in which cooperation with Hungary seemed to be the most rewarding among its neighbours. Reconciliation is also in Hungary’s interest, also in a broader context, as through this it can be made clear that progress is possible, even in such strained inter-state relations as those that characterised the Hungarian-Serbian relationship in the 20th century. In addition, there is another important aspect that did not play any role in the other two reconciliation processes, but is of paramount importance for Hungary: the issue of minorities. After 2000, a generous minority policy gained space in Serbia, which took the form of, for example, preferential representation of nationalities in parliament and the creation of self-governing institutions, national councils with cultural autonomy, such as the Hungarian National Council.
In 2001, the Parliament of Vojvodina set up a special committee to compile a list of the names of the innocent people of Vojvodina who were humiliated, tortured and executed between 1941 and 1945, which by 2009, had identified nearly 89,000 people, of whom around 5,000 were Hungarians, extending the focus of the search back to 1948. In 2009, according to the agreement between the heads of state László Sólyom and Boris Tadić, a Hungarian-Serbian Joint Academic Committee was established to facilitate the excavation, and the Hungarian National Council, the self-governing body of the Hungarian community in Serbia, played a key role in the uncovering. Improving bilateral relations eventually led to the head of state’s paying tribute in Čurug on 26 June 2013, and on 30 October 2014 the Serbian government repealed the 1944-45 resolutions declaring the collective guilt of the former Hungarian population of the villages of Čurug, Žabalj and Mošorin.
It is important to point out that the process of Hungarian-Serbian reconciliation would certainly not have started had Serbia not established the legal institutions that are available to Hungarians, and other nationalities, today. Hungary cannot get around the issue of Hungarians living abroad in order to establish a relationship of trust with its neighbours, meaning that reconciliation with its neighbours requires the establishment of a relationship between the states concerned that enables the realisation of the main objective of Hungarian minority policy, namely to prosper as Hungarians in the place where they were born. In Serbia, the functioning of national councils, the recognised minorities’ self-governing bodies with cultural competences, was regulated by law in 2002 and 2009, and the Hungarian Association of Vojvodina (VMSZ), the most important political organisation for Hungarians, is part of the government in both Serbia and Vojvodina.
The author would like to thank László Horváth for his professional assistance in the preparation of this entry. Opening image: Flickr / Marina Neskovic