{"id":63404,"date":"2026-07-21T09:59:42","date_gmt":"2026-07-21T07:59:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ludovika.hu\/?p=63404"},"modified":"2026-07-23T10:01:35","modified_gmt":"2026-07-23T08:01:35","slug":"the-eus-geoeconomic-moves","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ludovika.hu\/en\/blogs\/the-daily-european\/2026\/07\/21\/the-eus-geoeconomic-moves\/","title":{"rendered":"The EU’s Geoeconomic Moves"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Although the European Commission has described itself as an “Investment Commission”, its activities in recent months have clearly carried a geoeconomic and geopolitical focus.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As August approaches, EU institutions are slowly preparing for their summer break, and the pace of decision-making bodies will slow down significantly until the autumn restart. This is exactly why the summer break acts as a natural dividing line: by this time, processes have matured, and this is the period when a cycle can be considered meaningfully closed. For this reason, it makes sense to look back at the geoeconomic steps taken over the past nearly twelve months as a connected picture. Since September 2025, the EU’s leaders and institutions have taken several significant steps to strengthen their position in the world’s geoeconomic space. The most important actions of recent months can be grouped around three major geoeconomic strategic goals. Below, we will look at each of these in detail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Becoming Independent from China, the Big “De-risking”<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

It seems that most of the EU’s measures are connected to this thread, since almost every point touches on it. First, it\u2019s worth looking at the details of the EU\u2013India Trade Agreement<\/a>. After several decades, the negotiations were concluded in New Delhi in January 2026, the formal signing is expected by the end of 2026, followed by approval from the European Parliament and ratification by member states. The trade agreement creates a market of nearly 2 billion people, since it connects the EU with the world’s most populous country and its fourth-largest economy. Under the deal, 96.6% of EU exports will be affected by tariff cuts or exemptions, and Indian tariffs on European cars will drop from 110% to 10\u201335%. The goal is to double the current annual trade volume of \u20ac180 billion by 2032. An important detail is that agriculture was left out of the agreement to protect small Indian farmers, while in exchange, Indian citizens will gain much greater freedom to move and work within the EU. Europe is keeping its EU CBAM tariffs on Indian steel exports in place. In this case, the geopolitical goal is clear: to make supply chains less dependent on China. Compared with China, India’s economic and political system is undoubtedly closer to the models the European Union prefers. This close cooperation is underlined by the fact that, alongside the trade agreement, the two partners also signed a security and defense partnership, and in July 2026, talks began under the Trade and Technology Council<\/a> on India joining Horizon Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second major measure worth mentioning is the EU\u2013Mercosur Partnership Agreement<\/a> and interim Trade Agreement. The approval and ratification process for the Mercosur agreement was completed in early 2026. Alongside serious internal disputes<\/a> over agriculture, the process offers geopolitical and industrial benefits. The tension around the treaty comes mainly from three issues: protecting agriculture, responding to industrial overcapacity, and gaining cheaper access to critical raw materials. The declaration adopted after the EU\u2013CELAC Summit<\/a>, reaffirming the intention to cooperate, fits into this same picture: its aim<\/a> was to strengthen critical raw materials and secure supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similar goals apply to the EU\u2013Indonesia free trade agreement<\/a> (finalized during 2025) and the EU\u2013Uzbekistan<\/a> Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Both explicitly aim to secure supply chains for critical raw materials. In addition, Uzbekistan plays a key role in diversifying EU\u2019s raw materials and energy supply in Central Asia’s. The same goal appears in the RESourceEU Action Plan,<\/a> which will establish a Critical Raw Materials Center<\/a>. The core idea of this draft legislation is to create a comprehensive EU strategy to guarantee the security of supply for critical raw materials (CRM), reduce external dependencies, and strengthen the EU’s economic security in line with new geopolitical realities. The plan aims that, by 2030, at least 10% of consumption will come from EU mining, 40% from processing, and 25% from recycling within the EU \u2014 meaning the EU wants to grow its own internal capacity. In addition, no single third country will be allowed to supply more than 65% of demand for any single strategic raw material. The planned European Centre for Critical Raw Materials is set to be established in 2026 to coordinate strategic oversight, stockpiling, and joint purchasing. Over the next 12 months, it aims to mobilize \u20ac3 billion in EU funding to directly support the value chain, and nearly \u20ac600 million will be set aside under Horizon Europe for raw material substitution and more efficient extraction technologies. From September 2026, exporting “black mass” (battery waste) outside the OECD will be banned. It’s worth noting here that the Asian country dominates the global battery industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Not surprisingly, under the EU’s Economic Security Strategy<\/a>, “de-risking” has become a binding standard, and leaders have tightened the mechanisms that monitor EU companies’ outbound investments (especially to China), particularly in quantum technology, semiconductors, AI, and biotechnology, and have introduced stricter screening for dual-use research.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU\u2013Armenia Connectivity Partnership Agreement<\/a> (signed on May 5, 2026) also serves, through the Global Gateway strategy, the goal of reshaping infrastructure and digital dependencies and moving Armenia out of China’s and Russia’s sphere of influence in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU’s trade agreements aimed at its geoeconomic goals are not only about incentives. The EU’s 19th<\/a> (October 2025) and 20th<\/a> (April 2026) sanctions packages punish, among others, Indian and Chinese companies and banks for supplying dual-use technology and chips to Russia’s war industry. Additionally, it blacklists more than 100 “shadow fleet” tanker ships. This is somewhat contradictory alongside the agreement signed with India, but it clearly shows how deepening economic partnership and the EU’s security policy run in parallel, even if sometimes in tension with each other. These policy decisions lead us the EU’s second geopolitical priority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Complete Break with Russia<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The European Union wants to become fully independent from Russian energy sources, a goal it plans to achieve through the RePowerEU<\/a> program. The legislation<\/a> adopted in January 2026 mandates a complete halt to Russian gas. This includes a ban on LNG in all EU ports by the end of 2026 (affecting Spain, Belgium, and France); and a full stop to pipeline gas imports from Russia by September 30, 2027 (affecting Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia), which poses a serious challenge for these three member states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

EU\u2013Armenia relations have become much closer in recent months and show a clear stance against Russia. The EU\u2013Armenia Partnership Council<\/a> adopted a Strategic Partnership Agenda, setting out the framework for bilateral relations and confirming Yerevan’s aim to integrate with the EU. A Visa Liberalisation Action Plan sets out biometric passport, border control, and fundamental rights reforms needed to reach visa-free travel in the Schengen area. In June 2026 a \u20ac2.2 million support project was launched alongside it. Together, these steps aim to reduce Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Specifically: under the European Peace Facility, the Armenian army received a \u20ac20 million<\/a> military capacity-building package; and in April 2026, the EUPM Armenia<\/a> civilian advisory mission (against hybrid threats, cybercrime, and disinformation) was approved. All of this complements the goal of the full stop on Russian gas: while one measure cuts energy dependence, the other aims to ease regional security dependence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defending Against Pressure from the US and China<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The EU\u2013US Customs and Trade Agreement<\/a> is a compromise reached with the Trump administration, in effect since autumn 2025, aimed at easing transatlantic tensions and protecting key industries. It’s worth noting that, under this deal, the EU committed to buying huge amounts of energy from the US. One reason the EU accepted terms that were, in many ways, unfavorable is that in the event of a trade war, the EU would suffer major losses due to its dependence on American technology. Since autumn 2025, the EU has worked hard to improve its position in this area. First worth mentioning is the new European Technological Sovereignty Package<\/a>, which specifically targets dependence on the US and China and contains two legislative proposals. One part of it is the Chips Act 2.0<\/a>, an extension of the original 2023 law. The new policy no longer focuses only on building factories but also sets rules for internal market demand and public procurement advantages for European-made microchips needed for artificial intelligence. The second part of the package is the draft Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA)<\/a>. At its core, this draft law sets binding rules for building strictly EU-based, protected cloud capacity, offering an open alternative to American technology dominance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, it’s worth mentioning Wero<\/a>, the European digital wallet created to break the dominance of the American Visa and Mastercard networks and to help introduce the digital euro. Although the platform currently works in only a few EU member states, it is expected to spread over time and could even push overseas alternatives out of European markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The various tariffs imposed by President Trump have significantly reshaped the EU’s trade relations, and this sped up the creation of the EU\u2013India agreement. Similarly, in May 2026, American trade pressure played a key role in creating the EU\u2013Mexico Modernized Global Agreement.<\/a> This treaty replaces the outdated framework from the 2000s, expanding it from rules covering only industrial goods to a much broader structure. Under the agreement, about 99% of remaining tariffs will be eliminated; Mexico will scrap its 20\u201345% agricultural tariffs (important for the EU on products like cheese, milk powder, pork, and wine); and there will be mutual protection of geographical indications (for example, Tequila and Mezcal versus European products). In addition, public procurement, financial services, and maritime shipping markets will also open up to EU businesses. The agreement is both a defense against Trump’s tariff policy and an attempt to push back against China’s growing influence in Latin America, as well as a way to support nearshoring.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alongside its efforts to reduce dependence on China for critical raw materials, the EU has also introduced several measures to protect its own markets from Chinese products. It’s worth reviewing the most important ones, without aiming to be complete.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The European Commission has returned to closing a loophole created by one of its own 2024 measures. The EU had earlier decided to introduce countervailing duties on battery electric vehicles from China, setting final tariffs of up to 35.3%<\/a> on individual manufacturers such as BYD, Geely, and SAIC. However, it’s worth noting that the tariff framework took another turn in the summer of 2026, as legal preparations began to extend these measures to close loopholes for plug-in hybrids<\/a> (PHEVs) as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In one of the most significant customs reforms in EU history, the duty-free exemption<\/a> for shipments under \u20ac150 was abolished, a move aimed directly at Chinese online marketplaces like Temu and Shein. While this step protects the EU’s internal market and the flat tariff simplifies the process, the administrative burden \u2014 especially handling electronic customs declarations through the IOSS system \u2014 raises serious capacity concerns for member states’ customs authorities. On the topic of dumped goods, it’s also worth looking at measures to block steel dumping. On June 29, 2026, the European Commission issued a regulation<\/a>, effective July 1, 2026, that sets a duty-free quota of 18.3 million tonnes per year, with a 50% punitive tariff applied above that limit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, after heated debates, the Industrial Accelerator Act<\/a> was submitted to protect the EU’s internal market. It aims to support the European industrial development plan as well as domestically produced clean technologies and industrial raw materials. This draft law appears to be a direct response to Europe’s competitiveness challenges. The Chinese government’s official protest<\/a> against the plan clearly shows the geoeconomic weight of the regulation, which aims to give European manufacturers an advantage in public procurement markets. On the other hand, this kind of industrial policy intervention also raises questions about tension with free trade principles, which could well become the subject of future WTO complaints.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusions<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The overall pattern is that, since September 2025, the EU has been doing two things at once: opening new partnerships (India, Mexico, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Armenia) and closing off its vulnerable points (Russia, dependence on American technology, and exposure to China). The bilateral agreements aim to expand diversification, while structural measures, such as the economic security framework, the halt on Russian gas, various sanctions, and market-protection mechanisms, aim to eliminate vulnerabilities. Together, these two types of measures form a fairly coherent geoeconomic strategy through which the EU is trying to protect its own sovereignty. At the same time, it’s important to note that, especially in defense and military industry cooperation, the EU has built extremely close ties with the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom. In other words, it seems that in most areas the EU is trying to strengthen its own role and independence, while in the energy and defense industries a kind of bloc formation is emerging between the EU and the US \u2013 one that, as strictly as possible, excludes Russian and Chinese markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This bloc formation, the close energy and defense-industry cooperation between the EU and the US, combined with the strictest possible exclusion of Russian and Chinese markets creates double pressure for Hungary on several fronts. On one hand, the planned halt to pipeline gas imports from Russia in September 2027 will dismantle an infrastructural dependency. Its removal in Central Europe places serious demands in terms of time, money, and technology. On the other hand, closer integration into the Western bloc whether through buying American energy, joint defense procurement, or reducing exposure to Chinese technology could formally act as an incentive, but Hungary’s economy, which has so far been open to Asian markets and Russian energy, faces distinctive transitional burdens as a result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Added to this are the ongoing debates around budget conditionality for the next financial cycle. The “EU coefficients,” rule-of-law criteria, and performance-measurement frameworks tie access to funding to conditions that themselves produce this bloc formation. In other words, Hungary must simultaneously manage the short-term adjustments involved in switching energy sources, the reshaping of its trade relations with Asia, and the longer-term renegotiation of the terms of its structural dependence on funding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Photo: motioncenter \/ depositphotos.com<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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